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Abstract 
 
In the last 20 years, agencies and departments in the State of 
California have initiated seismic vulnerability programs for 
state-owned buildings with goals ranging from life safety to 
reduced post-earthquake disruption.  Until now, there has not 
been an assessment of all state-owned buildings with the goal 
of identifying and assessing the seismic vulnerability of those 
buildings needed for response and recovery efforts after an 
earthquake.   
 
The California Vital Infrastructure Vulnerability Assessment 
Project (Cal VIVA), sponsored by the California Emergency 
Management Agency (Cal EMA) and funded through FEMA, 
has developed a statewide approach to assessing the 
vulnerability of the state-owned building stock.  Cal VIVA, 
undertaken by engineering faculty at California Polytechnic 
State University, San Luis Obispo, is assisting Cal EMA in 
preparing for natural disasters by identifying state-owned 
buildings that house critical functions and are vulnerable to 
earthquakes.   
 
The initial phase of the project included the development of a 
methodology for identifying critical and vulnerable state-
owned buildings.  The methodology was tested with four 
departments; Caltrans, Department of Water Resources, 
California Highway Patrol and Cal FIRE.   Later phases of 
Cal VIVA will expand to additional agencies, develop 
guidelines for individual departments programs and create a 
state-wide reporting mechanism.  A critical outcome of Cal 
VIVA is to provide for a systematic basis to apply for federal 
hazard mitigation funding to reduce seismic vulnerabilities of 
state- owned buildings critical to response and recovery 
efforts after an earthquake.  
 
 
 
 
 
This paper will describe the process of building selection, the 
pitfalls and successes, the preliminary conclusions and next 
steps.   
  
Introduction 
 
The California Vital Infrastructure Vulnerability Assessment 
Project (Cal VIVA), sponsored by the California Emergency 
Management Agency (Cal EMA) and funded through FEMA 
is a critical part of the 2010 California State Multi-Hazard 
Mitigation Plan also known as the State Hazard Mitigation 
Plan (SHMP). The purpose of the SHMP, is to significantly 
reduce deaths, injuries, and other disaster losses caused by 
natural and human caused hazards in California. The SHMP 
describes past and current hazard mitigation activities and 
outlines goals, strategies, and actions for reducing future 
disaster losses.  
 
Cal VIVA, as part of the SHMP, has the overarching goal of 
assisting Cal EMA to prepare for natural disasters by 
identifying state-owned buildings that house critical functions 
and are vulnerable to earthquakes.  The project began in early 
2011 and is due to be completed in early 2013.  The project 
has three main focus areas: 
1) Develop a methodology to identify potentially 
vulnerable state-owned and operated buildings that 
are essential to response and recovery efforts after 
an earthquake.  
2) Test the methodology on 15 – 20 state-owned and 
operated buildings.  The testing process will include 
seismic assessments, and upgrade concepts with 
budgetary costing.  
2 
3) Develop plans for improvements to the methodology 
and recommendations regarding priorities for project 
funding and development. 
Cal VIVA was undertaken as a joint effort by faculty of 
California Polytechnic State University (Cal Poly) and staff at 
Cal EMA. A Vulnerable Infrastructure Strategic Work Group 
(VISWG), composed of representatives from state agencies, 
planners and engineers, was established to assist with the 
development of approaches for the screening of state-owned 
buildings, the seismic assessment methodology and to 
provide oversight of the results and conclusions.   
 
The seismic vulnerability of state-owned buildings has been a 
concern for many years.  Some key programs that have 
focused on this issue include the California Proposition 122, 
Bonds for Seismic Retrofitting program in the 1990’s as well 
as programs by individual departments and entities such as 
the University of California, California State University, 
Administrative Office of the Courts and the California 
Department of Transportation.  These have all differed from 
the Cal VIVA project in fundamental ways.  The Proposition 
122 program was state-wide, but was not focused on essential 
facilities required to provide post-disaster response services.  
The program instead focused on large occupancy buildings 
important to recovery efforts.  Other programs have been 
limited to individual departments and entities with differing 
prioritization and assessment approaches. 
 
Methodology to Identify Vulnerable State Buildings  
 
In order to develop a methodology to identify the 
vulnerability of state-owned building it was necessary to 
understand the organizational structure of the State and its 
internal reporting mechanisms.  
 
There are 13 primary agencies in the executive branch of the 
State with 62 departments within those agencies. In addition 
to these agencies and departments there are numerous 
commissions, and councils. The Department of General 
Services maintains the State of California State Property 
Inventory (SPI) which lists approximately 24,000 state-
owned buildings, including those owned by the University of 
California and the California State University.  For any 
specific building, SPI lists building size, location, estimated 
date of construction and use.  Although SPI is intended to 
contain all state-owned buildings, the inventory relies on 
voluntary reporting by the various state agencies and 
departments, and therefore has been found to not be a 
comprehensive list.   
 
A methodology was developed to systematically review the 
seismic vulnerability of such a large number of buildings.  A 
screening method was developed that has three triggers: 1) 
Functionality, 2) Building Vulnerability and 3) Site 
Seismicity.  
 
Trigger 1 - Functionality.  Initially, two types of functionality 
triggers were proposed; personnel and building functionality.  
The personnel functionality trigger was for State personnel 
that had post-earthquake responsibilities that could be 
performed at other locations.  These agencies/departments 
were preliminarily identified from the 2009 State Emergency 
Plan (SEP). To provide appropriate resiliency, the 
agencies/departments should be housed in facilities that 
provide life safety to occupants and have access to back-up 
facilities that would allow post-earthquake functions.  Upon 
investigation, it was determined that the number of personnel 
and subsequent number of buildings covered under this 
criterion was extremely large. This subset of the functionality 
trigger was put on hold for later phases of Cal VIVA to allow 
the project to focus on the critical building functionality 
trigger.  
 
The focus of Cal VIVA was the trigger: building 
functionality requiring an Immediate Occupancy performance 
level for essential facilities.  This functionality trigger applies 
to state-owned and operated facilities where operations are 
considered essential during an emergency and the subsequent 
recovery effort.  These facilities fall into the following broad 
categories:  Emergency Operations Centers, utilities, and vital 
records.   
 
In order to locate such critical buildings a two-step process 
was developed. First, agencies/departments would be selected 
that had first responder duties after an earthquake. Second, 
staff from the selected agencies/department would work with 
the Cal VIVA team to develop a list of critical facilities.    
 
Exploration of the State’s specific emergency response and 
recovery plans indicated that these plans are undergoing 
significant revision and were not available for review. The 
State Hazard Mitigation Officer selected four departments 
with critical response and recovery responsibilities to test the 
Cal VIVA methodology. These four departments were 
confirmed by the VISWG.  Specific buildings within each 
agency/department that house essential facilities were 
selected based on recommendations by the respective staff.  
 
Trigger 2 - Building Vulnerability.  The building’s 
vulnerability is determined largely by its structural system 
type and the structural building code provisions under which 
it was designed.  The most likely source for determination of 
that information is the building’s construction drawings. 
However there is no central state repository for the 
construction drawings of state-owned buildings.  Because 
many of these drawings were not archived in a central 
location, locating the drawings was difficult. If the building 
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was inventoried in SPI only the size, location, and age of 
construction was known not the type of construction.  
Individual departments were often able to provide anecdotal 
information as to the building’s age and type which allowed 
preliminary conclusions to be drawn as to the building’s 
vulnerability. This anecdotal information was used for the 
second trigger. Due to the difficulty in obtaining the drawing, 
the search for the building drawings did not occur until a 
building met all three triggers and was designated for an 
assessment.  
 
Seismic assessments were generally not proposed for 
structures which were designed to standards substantially 
consistent with current building codes for essential facilities 
or had been seismically upgraded to such standards. 
 
Trigger 3 - Site Seismicity.  Cal VIVA focused on buildings 
located in areas of high seismicity. Buildings were selected 
from geographic areas that have high seismicity as defined by 
ASCE 31: SDS> 0.500 and SD1> 0.200.  SPI contains the 
building address and latitude and longitude. For building not 
found in SPI the information was developed. Using 
Geographic Information system (GIS) the building location 
was superimposed on a map showing area seismicity. This 
broad definition of high seismicity resulted in a large number 
of buildings. For this first effort many buildings were selected 
from the San Francisco and Los Angeles areas to permit 
observations about area-wide vulnerability.  
 
The use of these three triggers was reviewed by and received 
concurrence from the VISWG. 
 
Assessment Methods 
 
Assessments of vulnerability were based on ASCE 31-03 
Seismic Evaluation of Existing Buildings (ASCE 31) a 
national standard that contains seismic assessment 
procedures. The intent of choosing this method is its wide 
general acceptance and its three-tiered system. The concept 
was that a large number of the buildings could be rapidly 
assessed as Tier 1 buildings which would provide a broad 
look at vulnerability.   
 
The ASCE 31 assessments included reviews of the original 
structural drawings, site visits, the preparation of the limited 
structural calculations described by ASCE 31 and the 
completion of the ASCE 31 checklists.  The assessments 
included reviews of potential site issues and the non-
structural systems (based on site observations).  The scope 
included the development of upgrade concepts which were 
based on the fundamental approaches of ASCE 41-06 Seismic 
Rehabilitation of Existing Structures.  
 
Consistent with the Benchmark provisions of ASCE 31 Table 
3-1, seismic assessments were not performed for structures 
which were designed to standards substantially consistent 
with current building codes for essential facilities or had been 
seismically upgraded to such standards.  The use of ASCE 
31, a national standard, was confirmed by the VISWG as the 
assessment method for the project.  In addition, based on 
recommendations by the VISWG, supplemental HAZUS 
analyses using the Advanced Engineering Module are being 
undertaken for selected buildings.  As stated on the FEMA 
website, “Hazus is a nationally applicable standardized 
methodology that contains models for estimating potential 
losses from earthquakes, floods, and hurricanes.”  
 
Although both ASCE 31 and HAZUS are recognized national 
standards for building seismic assessment they bring different 
information to the project.  HAZUS will provide additional 
information including damage state probabilities rather than 
the compliant or not-compliant results of ASCE 31.  
  
Vulnerable Infrastructure Strategic Work Group 
 
The creation of the VISWG was an important component of 
the project.  The VISWG was formed to assist with the 
development of approaches for the screening of state-owned 
buildings, the seismic assessment methodology and to 
provide oversight of the results and conclusions.  Members 
were selected that had both technical and policy backgrounds 
allowing for input on both aspects of the Cal VIVA project.  
The VISWG includes representatives from applicable State 
agencies as well as experienced engineers and planners from 
private practice.  The VISWG held several meetings in 2011 
and will meet again in 2012.  The VISWG confirmed the 
methods for selecting buildings and for their assessment and 
provided valuable comments and recommendations.  The Cal 
VIVA team is grateful for their participation. 
 
Selection of Department Buildings for Assessment  
 
Challenges were encountered in selecting facilities for 
assessment from the inventory of state-owned buildings.  One 
was that the state response and recovery plans were not 
available, limiting a test of Trigger 1 - Functionality.  As a 
workaround, the State Hazard Mitigation Officer selected the 
four departments. The selections of the four departments 
were confirmed by the VISWG.  
 
It was difficult to systematically use Trigger 2 - Building 
Vulnerability since drawings for many buildings were not 
archived in a central location and were difficult to locate. By 
working with individuals from the selected 
agencies/departments who had in-depth knowledge of their 
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building stock, it was possible to focus efforts on critical 
buildings.    
 
Trigger 3 - Site Seismicity was successfully applied with the 
selection of buildings in areas if high seismicity. 
 
The four departments chosen to test the Cal VIVA 
methodology are: California Department of Transportation 
(Caltrans), with responsibility for post-earthquake 
transportation; California Highway Patrol (CHP), also with 
responsibility for post-earthquake transportation; California 
Department of Forestry and Fire Protection (Cal FIRE), with 
responsibility for fire response coordination; and California 
Department of Water Resources (DWR), with responsibility 
for the state water project.   
 
In each department, contact was made with a designated 
representative.  This representative assisted with the selection 
of buildings, obtained drawings, and provided access to the 
buildings being assessed.  These were often not easy tasks 
and the Cal VIVA team is grateful for their assistance.   
 
The selection of buildings to be assessed was based on the 
three triggers described above: functionality, building 
vulnerability and site seismicity. The buildings selected with 
each department’s recommendations are described below. 
 
California Department of Transportation.  Caltrans is 
composed of twelve districts.  Each district contains a 
building that houses a Traffic Management Center (TMC) 
and an Emergency Operations Center (EOC).  Each district 
also has a building designated as an Alternate Emergency 
Operations Center (Alternate EOC).  Of the twelve districts, 
approximately seven include areas of high seismicity.  
Because of the intent to primarily assess buildings from the 
San Francisco and Los Angeles areas, Districts 4 and 7 were 
selected.  The facilities in these two districts include a variety 
of ages and structural types.   
 
Two facilities were chosen in District 4.  The District 4 
TMC/EOC is a fifteen-story building, located in Oakland.  It 
was constructed in approximately 1992 recently received a 
seismic upgrade.   The District 4 Alternate EOC is a one-
story building built in the 1960s in Walnut Creek.  
 
Two facilities were chosen in District 7. The District 7 
TMC/EOC is a four-story building located in Glendale.  It 
was designed to meet essential facility code provisions and 
was completed in 2006.  The District 7 Alternate EOC is a 
one-story building located in Commerce and designed in 
1988.   
 
 
A map of California showing seismicity and Caltrans district 
TMC/EOCs and Alternate EOCs is shown in Figure 1. 
 
 
 
Figure 1 Caltrans District EOC & TMC Locations 
 
California Highway Patrol.  The CHP is composed of eight 
districts and operates approximately 100 Area Offices 
throughout California.  They are typically one-story buildings 
with floor areas of 10,000 to 15,000 square feet.  
Construction is a mix of CMU, tilt-up concrete or wood walls 
generally with wood roof framing.  Eight area offices were 
selected, three in the San Francisco area, two on the Central 
Coast and four in the Los Angeles area.  The ones selected 
were designed in the 1960’s and early 70s and are 
representative of the building stock.   
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A map of California showing seismicity and CHP Area 
Offices is shown in Figure 2.     
 
 
 
Figure 2 CHP Area Office Locations 
 
 
Department of Water Resources.  The DWR operates 20 
pumping plants and four pumping-generating plants that 
supply water to approximately 25 million Californians.  The 
pumping plants and pumping-generating plants are typically 
large structures with three to four stories below grade and a 
high bay superstructure.  They were primarily built in the 
1970’s with some undergoing expansions in the 1990’s.  Five 
facilities were selected on the basis of seismicity and 
importance as determined by DWR staff.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
A map of California showing seismicity and DWR pumping 
and pumping-generating plants is shown in Figure 3 
 
     
 
Figure 3 DWR Plant Locations 
 
California Department of Forestry and Fire Protection.  Cal 
FIRE operates a variety of facilities throughout the state 
including fire stations, lookout towers, communications 
facilities, headquarters and command centers.  The state is 
divided into 21 areas, each with a unit headquarters and a 
command center.  There are North and South Region 
Headquarters, located in Redding and Fresno.  Many of the 
unit headquarters and command centers were replaced in the 
1990’s and were designed to essential facility status so are 
assumed to be compliant.  Several older facilities are slated 
for replacement in the near future.  The four candidate 
facilities in Mendocino County being considered for 
assessments based on their age and area seismicity are a unit 
headquarters, command center, air attack base and helicopter 
attack base.    
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A map of California showing seismicity and Cal FIRE 
headquarters is shown in Figure 4.     
 
 
Figure 4 Cal FIRE Headquarters Locations 
 
Hazus Evaluation 
 
As work continued on Cal VIVA it became evident that the 
methodology was valid, but the bottoms-up approach of 
looking at individual buildings within the context of an 
extremely large number of buildings meant a lengthy process. 
The Cal VIVA team felt that other options should be 
explored. One option is the use of Hazus, a methodology that 
estimates potential losses from earthquakes, floods, and 
hurricanes. Hazus uses Geographic Information Systems 
(GIS) technology to estimate physical, economic, and social 
impacts of disasters.  
 
While working on the assessments of the buildings within 
each department patterns of building types started to emerge. 
Specifically it was noted that the critical area offices for 
CHP, which number over 100, have strong similarities in 
basic ages and building type. This observation indicated that 
information obtained from the CHP site investigations could 
be effectively used as Hazus input.  Currently the Cal Poly 
team is developing a Hazus Advanced Engineering Building 
Model for CHP that will be used to estimate average annual 
loss and annualized causalities.  
 
Summary of Assessment Results 
 
A total of 17 buildings from three departments have been 
assessed to date: four Caltrans buildings, five DWR buildings 
and eight CHP buildings.  The assessments of the Cal FIRE 
buildings are pending.   
 
As specified by ASCE 31, the assessments included reviews 
of the original structural drawings, site visits, the preparation 
of structural calculations and the completion of ASCE 31 
checklists, including those for site hazards and non-structural 
systems.  Some of the facilities underwent a Tier 1 
assessment, some a Tier 2.  The project scope also included 
the preparation of upgrade concepts and budgetary costs.  The 
results for each department are summarized below. 
 
California Department of Transportation.  Caltrans is in the 
process of upgrading their TMC/EOC facilities and the 
Oakland and Glendale buildings are two examples of several 
such buildings.   
 
The District 7 TMC/EOC is located in a four-story steel 
framed building located in Glendale.  The drawings state that 
the structural system as well as the bracing and anchorage of 
non-structural elements were designed to provide compliance 
with essential facility code provisions for a fixed base 
building.  Prior to construction the building design was 
apparently modified and constructed with a seismic isolation 
system.  The site visit confirmed the general construction of 
the building, the general compliance of non-structural 
components and that the detailing of building systems at the 
plane of isolation could accommodate the specified 
movement.  On this basis the building meets the requirements 
for an immediate occupancy facility.  
 
A photo of the building housing the District 7 TMC/EOC is 
shown in Figure 5.     
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Figure 5 Caltrans District 7 TMC/EOC (photo by the 
authors) 
 
The District 4 TMC/EOC is in a fifteen-story steel moment 
frame building constructed in approximately 1992 in 
Oakland.  The building received a seismic upgrade, 
completed in 2010, that was composed of the upgrade of 
selected bays of the original moment frames and the 
installation of viscous dampers.    The viscous dampers were 
installed in two bays along each perimeter face for the full 
height of the building.   
 
The upgrade of the existing moment frames was composed of 
strengthening of the existing beam-to-column connections 
and column splices.  All of the bays of the original steel 
moment frames were upgraded from the first through the 
seventh floor and a majority of the bays were upgraded at the 
levels above.  The criteria set for the seismic upgrade design 
was to a State of California Risk Level III with performance 
goals as stated on the drawings of “minor, repairable” 
structural damage and “moderate damage” with “extensive 
repairs” to non-structural elements for the “Design Basis 
Earthquake”.  The State of California Risk Level III does not 
have direct correlation with ASCE 31 or 41 performance 
levels.  Risk Level III lies between the Life Safety and 
Immediate Occupancy performance levels and can essentially 
be considered as Life-Safety plus.  The existing bracing and 
anchorage of non-structural elements was not upgraded.   
 
The site visit confirmed the general construction of the 
upgraded building and that the existing bracing and 
anchorage of the non-structural systems appeared to be 
appropriate for a normal occupancy building.  Although the 
seismic upgrade appears to have been well conceived and 
implemented and will greatly improve the building’s seismic 
performance, the upgrade criteria was explicitly not to an 
immediate occupancy level and the bracing and anchorage of 
the systems serving the TMC/EOC are not to essential facility 
status.  Further study was recommended to review these 
issues.  
 
The buildings designated as the District 4 and 7 Alternate 
EOCs are older buildings that have not been upgraded as 
might be appropriate for their proposed function and their 
seismic performance is anticipated to be poor.   
 
The District 4 Alternate EOC, in Walnut Creek, was 
constructed in the 1960s with masonry walls and steel and 
wood roof framing. Following the requirements of ASCE 31, 
the building was assigned a Building Type RM1 and assessed 
using a Tier 1 Evaluation.  The site visit confirmed the 
general construction of the building and noted the bracing 
and anchorage of the non-structural elements.  Significant 
seismic deficiencies include inadequate CMU shear walls, 
inadequate diaphragms, lack of load path, lack of CMU wall 
anchorage and deficient partition and ceiling construction.   
 
The District 7 Alternate EOC, in Commerce, was constructed 
in the 1980s with wood framed walls and roof.  Following the 
requirements of ASCE 31, the building was assigned a 
Building Type W2 and assessed using a Tier 1 Evaluation. 
Significant seismic deficiencies include inadequate shear 
walls and inadequate load path and deficient bracing of 
cabinets and equipment.   
 
Significant upgrade measures would be required to bring 
either building to an immediate occupancy status.  Given the 
anticipated good performance of the primary TMC/EOCs, an 
Alternate EOC that is operational after a major earthquake 
may not be critical. 
 
California Highway Patrol.  The CHP has undertaken a 
program to replace many of the approximately 100 Area 
Offices it operates throughout California.  The replacement 
program has been based primarily on a need for more 
program space in the buildings, but the seismic vulnerability 
of many of the Area Offices has been a contributing factor.  
Eight area offices were selected for assessment, three in the 
San Francisco area, two on the Central Coast and four in the 
Los Angeles area.  The three triggers described earlier, 
functionality, building vulnerability and site seismicity, were 
used in their selection.  The Area Offices all have the critical 
function of acting as staging and communications hubs.  
Older buildings, designed in the 1960s and early 70s, were 
selected and the locations were all of high seismicity. 
 
The buildings are of similar size, one-story with floor areas of 
10,000 to 15,000 square feet.  The construction is a mix of 
CMU, tilt-up concrete or wood walls with generally wood 
roof framing.  The structures were Building Types W2, PC1 
or RM1, as defined by ASCE 31.  Tier 1 Evaluations were 
8 
used.  The site visits confirmed the general construction of 
the buildings and noted the bracing and anchorage of the non-
structural elements.  Many of the noted deficiencies were 
typical of designs of buildings of their vintage.  The buildings 
with CMU and tilt-up concrete walls typically had deficient 
wall anchorage, diaphragms and load paths.  The buildings 
with wood walls typically had deficient wood shear walls.  
The tall communication towers on the roofs of the buildings 
were guyed with cables with uncertain or deficient 
connections and deserve further review.   
 
Recommended upgrade measures include new connections to 
address the wall anchorage deficiency and new diagonal 
bracing to reduce diaphragm span.  The possibility of interim 
upgrade measures such as strengthening wall anchorage to 
reduce risk was discussed with CHP.  The seismic 
assessments may result in CHP adjusting their focus for 
building replacement to buildings in areas of high seismicity 
and with CMU and tilt-up concrete walls.     
 
There were also site hazards noted for most of the Area 
Offices assessed with six identified using state maps showing 
liquefaction potential.  The liquefaction potential needs to be 
confirmed by a geotechnical investigation. If the site is 
liquefiable it may make some upgrades infeasible.         
 
A photo of a typical CHP Area Office is shown in Figure 6.     
 
 
 
Figure 6 Representative CHP Area Office (photo by 
the authors) 
 
Department of Water Resources.  The facilities selected for 
assessment were representative of the 20 pumping plants and 
4 pumping-generating plants operated by DWR.  The plants 
house multiple large pump or turbine generators sets.  They 
were typically built in the 1970s although some were 
expanded during the 1990s.  Five facilities were selected in 
consultation with DWR staff on the basis of seismicity and 
functional importance.    
 
The buildings are typically large structures with three to four 
stories below grade constructed of massive reinforced 
concrete sections.  The below grade concrete structures 
support the above grade high bay superstructures.  The 
superstructures include bridge cranes used to service the 
pumps and other machinery.  The high bay superstructures 
are of structural steel construction with steel moment frames 
in transverse direction and braced frames in the longitudinal 
direction.  The buildings were assigned Building Types C2 
for the below grade structures and S1A and S2A for the 
superstructures, as defined by ASCE 31.  Tier 1 Evaluations 
were used for the below grade structures and Tier 2 for the 
above grade structures as required by ASCE 31. The site 
visits confirmed the general construction of the buildings and 
noted the bracing and anchorage of the non-structural 
elements.   
 
The below grade structures were determined to be compliant 
with ASCE 31 with expectedly low concrete stresses.  The 
above grade structures were generally compliant.  Stresses in 
the steel members were generally acceptable.  Connections, 
although not fully compliant with current requirements had 
generally low stresses and were generally judged to be 
acceptable.  Calculated drifts were less than 0.015 and were 
therefore compliant.  The superstructure of one pumping 
plant however was non-compliant, a result of heavy precast 
cladding that was not present on the other buildings.  
Potential upgrade measures consisting of reinforcement of the 
steel frames and member and base connections were 
developed.   
 
The bracing and anchorage of non-structural systems were 
also reviewed and appeared to be generally adequate.  The 
non-structural systems were very extensive and further 
investigation was recommended.  In addition, potentially 
vulnerable non-building components were observed but were 
not included in the scope of this assessment.  These included 
the piping into and out of the facility, the switchyard and 
transmission lines and roads to the facility.  
 
A potential for a surface fault rupture that passes through an 
outlet canal at one of the facilities was noted.  The 
liquefaction potential could not be determined from available 
information.   
 
With the exception of the one facility with the precast 
cladding, the results of the assessments were consistent for all 
facilities – compliant structures and generally good bracing 
and anchorage of non-structural elements.   
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A photo of a typical DWR pumping plant is shown in Figure 
7.   
 
 
 
Figure 7 DWR Pumping Plant (photo from 
http://www.water.ca.gov/swp/swptoday.cfm) 
 
California Department of Forestry and Fire Protection.  Four 
facilities in Mendocino County, a unit headquarters, a 
command center, an air attack base and a helicopter attack 
base, were selected as potential assessment candidates based 
on their age and the area seismicity.   
  
Conclusions 
 
Several conclusions can be drawn from the work done to 
date.   
 
1.  A methodology has been developed and successfully used 
to select buildings for assessment; however, the methodology 
is most effective at a department level not a state-wide level.   
 
Because the State of California owns in excess of 24,000 
buildings an approach was needed to prioritize the order of 
assessment.  A screening method was developed with three 
triggers: 1) Functionality, 2) Building Vulnerability and 3) 
Site Seismicity.  Although this is a reasonable approach for 
selecting buildings for assessment, application of the 
methodology on a state-wide basis has encountered obstacles 
in the use of Trigger 1 – Functionality and Trigger 2 – 
Building Vulnerability.    
 
It was difficult to apply Trigger 1 - Functionality, due to a 
lack of access to the State’s specific plans for response and 
recovery. The workaround of utilizing the knowledge of the 
State Hazard Mitigation Officer was successful.  Once the 
department was identified it was necessary to obtain an 
interagency request for assistance due to the personnel time 
commitment from the chosen department.    
 
Trigger 2 - Building Vulnerability was also difficult to use. 
There is no central repository for information on structural 
building system. The Department of General Services 
maintains a vault of buildings documents. However, 
maintenance of the vault has not been funded for years. Many 
agencies/departments do not retain the construction 
documents of their buildings. Using only age and building 
location is only a start to understanding the seismic 
vulnerability of older buildings.  
 
The project was successful when buildings were selected with 
the assistance of individual departments.  The departments 
were able to assist with the selection of buildings by 
providing information on their functional importance and on 
the building age and type.  In addition, the departments 
obtained drawings for the majority of the buildings and 
provided access to those buildings.   
 
2.  The Cal VIVA project identified distinct differences 
between the departments in their building stock and their 
ability to respond after a major earthquake.  These 
observations, summarized below, will help departments better 
focus their mitigation efforts. 
 
The Caltrans building assessments indicated that their 
modern or recently upgraded TMC/EOCs should provide 
good seismic performance with perhaps limited upgrade 
work.  Future seismic upgrades of a relatively small number 
of older TMC/EOCs should provide the department with a 
high level of resiliency.  The same high performance was not 
observed in the Alternate EOCs that were assessed.  This 
indicates that the Alternate EOCs should perhaps be only 
relied on for local, non-seismic disasters. 
 
The CHP buildings present a somewhat different picture.  
CHP has a large stock of critical buildings and many of them 
are older and are seismically vulnerable.  The CHP has 
embarked on a replacement program that should in time 
reduce their vulnerability and provide them with a high level 
of resiliency.  The Cal VIVA project provided an additional 
focus on the seismicity, building type and site hazards that 
the CHP did not have previously.  
 
Cal FIRE replaced many of their critical buildings in the 
1990s and many of their other older buildings are scheduled 
for replacement.  However they still have several older 
building that house critical functions.   Their replacement or 
upgrading should leave them also with a high level of 
resiliency.    
 
DWR provides water to 25 million Californians, clearly a 
vital function.  Key components of their system are the 
twenty pumping plants and four pumping-generating plants 
they operate.  Although many of the buildings were 
constructed in the 1970’s, their seismic performance is 
anticipated to be good.  Further studies should focus on the 
non-structural elements and perhaps on the cladding type to 
see if the deficiencies noted in the one facility with precast 
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cladding might occur in other buildings.  The effect of the 
potential surface fault rupture on one facility’s operation 
should also be reviewed.    
  
3.  Site hazards were uncovered that may affect the 
performance of the buildings. 
 
Two types of site hazards were noted that may affect facility 
safety and post-disaster operation.  One is the potential 
surface fault rupture at one DWR site.  The other is the 
potential for liquefaction noted at many of the CHP Area 
Offices that were assessed.  If the liquefaction potential is 
confirmed by Geotechnical Investigations, it may affect the 
feasibility seismic upgrades and alter the priority of facility 
replacement. 
 
4.  Revising the Cal VIVA methodology to accommodate the 
State’s organizational structure will improve the state’s 
ability to implement Cal VIVA. 
 
The State’s organizational structure is along agency and 
departmental lines. The lack of state-wide building 
documentation coupled with this organizational structure 
suggests that a revised Cal VIVA methodology with each 
agency/department taking the lead within their organization 
to assess building vulnerability could be very effective. Each 
department would report to a state-wide Cal VIVA system 
which would serve as a central repository for the information. 
This concept is being explored in a smaller follow-on Cal 
VIVA project.  
 
Increasing the resiliency of the state is a goal for all of us. In 
the past, an enormous amount of work has been done in 
California to reduce seismic vulnerability and improve the 
safety of its citizens. That work continues today in state 
agencies, counties, cities, businesses and homes across all 
public and private sectors.  Unfortunately due to the 
fragmented approach there is no real understanding of the 
total vulnerability of the state. Utilizing methodologies such 
as Cal VIVA and working together we can improve our 
knowledge, work to secure funding and systematically reduce 
the seismic vulnerability of California.   
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